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UNDERSTANDING THE “EXHAUSTION OF COVERAGE” 
DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTINUOUS TRIGGER 
COVERAGE 
JAMES M. FISCHER*
Excess insurance provides additional coverage beyond that provided 
by the underlying first layer of insurance, usually referred to as primary 
insurance policies. Excess insurance may, in turn, be layered with multiple 
layers of excess coverage. The combined, aggregate insurance policies are 
usually referred to as the “insured’s coverage program.” A fundamental issue 
with respect to the relationship between excess and underlying insurance is 
determining the event that triggers the specific excess coverage and brings it 
into play. Traditionally, the triggering event has been the “exhaustion” of the 
underlying insurance policy(ies), whether the underlying policy is primary 
or excess. 
The Exhaustion requirement was initially developed when insurance 
coverage was siloed within distinct policy periods.1 Siloing means there is a 
vertical tower of coverage, with layers of coverage, beginning with primary 
coverage2 and extending upwards through one or multiple layers of excess 
coverage. Exhaustion envisions that as each underlying layer of coverage is 
used up, (i.e., the policy limits are expended (“exhausted”)), the next layer 
of coverage can be accessed. While this approach is not without problems, it 
has worked tolerably well as a means of regulating the relationship between 
insurers who provided underlying and overlaying levels of coverage within 
a single policy period. 
The advent of continuous trigger coverage requires a reassessment 
of the relationship between underlying and overlaying insurers because 
siloing of coverage within a single policy period is no longer the norm. 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles, California. 
1 Initially, courts simply referred to the exhaustion of “all primary 
coverage” before an insured could access overlaying excess coverage. See, 
e.g., Olympic Ins. Co. v. Emp’rs Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 908, 
912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). The term “horizontal exhaustion” seems to have 
first appeared in an Illinois Court of Appeal decision in 1994. See United 
State Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 1261 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994) (distinguishing between “horizontal” and “vertical” exhaustion of 
underlying primary insurance coverage). 
2 Primary coverage refers to the first layer, often called the “working 
layer,” of coverage. Most claims against an insured are resolved within this 
first layer of coverage. 
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Rather, insurance coverage extends to losses than run across multiple policy 
periods.3 Insured losses can no longer be compartmentalized within a single 
policy period; rather, insurers (primary and excess) find that coverage is 
triggered whenever any portion of a loss can be deemed to have occurred in 
a policy period.4 The aggregation of coverage accomplished by the use of a 
continuous trigger led the California Supreme Court to characterize the 
resulting aggregation of coverage across multiple policy periods as “one 
                                                          
3 A continuous trigger means that an ongoing event, such as a pollutant 
contaminating underground water reservoirs, may trigger multiple policies 
that provide coverage during the contamination period. Courts applying a 
continuous trigger treat the injury attributable to the insured event as 
indivisible. State v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 281 P.3d 1000 (Cal. 2012). If the injury 
can be confined to a particular policy period, courts do not apply a 
continuous trigger. See, e.g., In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 
N.W.2d 405, 419 (Minn. 2003). Cf. N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. 
of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662-63 (Minn. 1994) (adopting continuous trigger 
because of the “scientific complexity of the issues involved, the extended 
period of time over which damages may have occurred before discovery, and 
the number of parties potentially involved”), and RESTATEMENT OF THE 
LAW OF LIAB. INS. §44, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) 
(“For liability claims involving divisible harm, courts generally will attempt 
to allocate among the policy periods according to the actual injury or harm 
that occurred during the policy period even if the total harm occurred over a 
long period of time.”). 
4 Most jurisdictions, including California, use the “injury in fact” test to 
implement the continuous trigger. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. 
Co., 913 P.2d 878, 894 (Cal. 1995) (“Under an injury-in-fact trigger, 
coverage is first triggered at that point in time at which an actual injury can 
be shown, retrospectively, to have been first suffered. This rationale places 
the injury- in-fact somewhere between the exposure, which is considered the 
initiating cause of the disease or bodily injury, and the manifestation of 
symptoms, which, logically, is only possible when an injury already exists. 
In the context of continuous or progressively deteriorating injuries, the 
injury-in-fact trigger, like the continuous injury, affords coverage for 
continuing or progressive injuries occurring during successive policy periods 
subsequent to the established date of the initial injury-in-fact.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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giant ‘uber-policy’ with a coverage limit equal to the sum of all purchased 
insurance policies across the period of loss.”5 
Treating policies within a continuous trigger period as an “Uber 
Policy” does not, however, directly address how overlaying policies should 
respond to a loss relative to the responsibility of an underlying policy, 
particularly that of primary insurers. In adopting the “continuous trigger” and 
“all sums stacking” approaches, the California Supreme Court did not 
address how coverages within the “uber-policy” should be sequenced. This 
is, however, a fundamentally important question because the “uber-policy” 
is an illusion if it cannot be effectively and efficiently accessed by the 
insured. As will be addressed in this paper, the sequencing of coverage 
provided by horizontal exhaustion results in the irony that the more coverage 
the insured purchases, the greater the likelihood much of the purchased 
insurance will not be available to pay claims put in coverage under the 
“continuous trigger” “all sums stacking” doctrines. 
For the most part, insurers, as a group have argued for “horizontal” 
exhaustion to determine when overlaying coverages first become responsible 
for a loss. Horizontal exhaustion requires that all underlying layers of 
coverage be “exhausted” before an overlaying level of coverage must 
provide coverage.6 For example, look at Schematic 1, on page 266. Assume 
an insured event triggers the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma policies under a 
continuous trigger. Under the horizontal exhaustion test, Excess Insurer 
Omega would argue that all underlying insurance from primary insurers 
Alpha, Beta, and Gamma would have to be exhausted before Omega would 
have a coverage obligation. Thus, even if the underlying Gamma policy was 
exhausted, Omega would have no coverage obligation until the underlying 
Alpha and Beta policies were also exhausted.  Under this approach, second 
layer excess Insurer Sigma would argue that it has no coverage obligations 
                                                          
5 State v. Continental Ins. Co., 281 P.3d 1000, 1008 (Cal. 2012). In this 
decision, the California Supreme Court used the term to describe the 
practical effect on insurers who provide coverage over a period of time to an 
insured who has sustained a progressive loss (e.g., environmental 
contamination) and coverage obligations are subject to both a “continuous 
trigger” and “all sums stacking.” The practical effect of adopting a 
“continuous trigger” and “all sums stacking” is that a loss that extends over 
several years separately triggers each year’s policies cumulatively. Id. 
6 See., e.g., Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Granite State Ins. Co., 330 
F.3d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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until all the underlying coverage provided by Primary Insurers Alpha, Beta, 
Gamma, and First Layer insurers Epsilon, Theta, and Omega was exhausted. 
Insurers often use the metaphor of a “rising tide” to illustrate the manner in 
which layers of coverage within an insured’s coverage program are accessed 
under the horizontal exhaustion approach. 
Schematic 1 
2d Layer, Excess 
Insurers Psi Sigma Chi 
1st Layer, Excess 
Insurers Epsilon Theta Omega 
Primary Layer, 
Insurers Alpha Beta Gamma 
 
Year 1 Policies Year 2 Policies Year 3 Policies 
Policyholders, on the other hand, usually advance the argument of 
“vertical” exhaustion.7 Vertical exhaustion applies traditional siloing to 
continuous trigger coverage cases. Under vertical exhaustion, overlaying 
insurer coverage is only dependent on the exhaustion of the specific policy 
underlying the overlaying insurance policy. For example, under Schematic 
1, using vertical exhaustion, once the underlying Gamma policy was 
exhausted, Omega’s excess policy would be triggered, even though neither 
the Alpha nor the Beta policies were exhausted.8 Vertical exhaustion is 
consistent with the traditional approach used when there is no continuous 
trigger. Each policy year is siloed (kept apart) from other policy years. 
Absent a continuous trigger, an insured event in year 2 would only trigger 
the Beta primary policy. The Alpha and Gamma policies would not be 
                                                          
7 Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 756 
(Ct. App. 2017), rev. granted Montrose Chem. Corp. v. S.C. (Canadian 
Universal Ins. Co.) 406 P.3d 327 (Cal. 2017) (mem.). 
8 See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 
740, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). This approach is particularly helpful to 
insureds if coverage is uneven because horizontal exhaustion will preclude 
immediate access to coverage in policy years with more excess coverage 
until underlying coverage in other policy years (with possibly lesser 
coverage (in terms of policy limits)) is exhausted. 
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triggered. If the Beta policy was exhausted, only the Theta policy would 
respond, and the Sigma policy would only respond if the Theta policy was 
exhausted. None of the excess insurers in years 1 and 3 would have coverage 
obligations upon the exhaustion of the Beta policy, or any year 2 policies for 
that matter. If a continuous trigger is applied, under vertical exhaustion, once 
the Beta policy is exhausted, the Theta policy is triggered. This triggering 
occurs even though the Alpha and Gamma policies are not exhausted. 
In this paper I explore a number of issues that relate to the selection 
of horizontal or vertical exhaustion in the context of a continuous trigger 
approach to coverage. The presence of one or more of these issues will 
ordinarily result in the inability to completely exhaust a successive layer of 
coverage, for example, the first layer of excess coverage shown on 
Schematic 1 across policy year 1 through 3. When this occurs, under the 
theory of horizontal exhaustion all overlaying policies anywhere in the 
coverage program will now escape any obligation to provide coverage. For 
example, if in Schematic 1 the Beta policy was not exhausted, under 
horizontal exhaustion all the overlaying excess insurers in the first and 
second excess layers of coverage for policy years 1-3 would escape coverage 
obligations. The consequence will be, if horizontal exhaustion is adopted, a 
cascading loss of coverage throughout all the towers of coverage from that 
point onward. 
The first part of this paper addresses whether policy language 
generally calls for adoption of horizontal or vertical exhaustion. Should the 
selection of horizontal or vertical exhaustion be a rule or interpretation or a 
rule of construction, like the doctrine of construction against the drafter 
(contra proferentem)? If selection of the exhaustion rule is seen as one of the 
policy interpretations, what language should be understood as selecting one 
exhaustion approach over the other? 
This paper next examines a number of doctrines that apply to the 
exhaustion issue in general. 
These include: 
First, should a settlement with an underlying insurer affect the 
obligations of higher layer insurers when they fail to exhaust policy limits? 
Second, and related to Second, should non-accumulation and prior 
insurance provisions affect the exhaustion issue? 
Third, should the insolvency of an underlying insurer affect the 
exhaustion issue? 
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Fourth, should loss allocation agreements between policyholders, 
such as indemnity and hold harmless agreements, affect the exhaustion 
issue? 
This paper concludes with an argument that when courts impose 
coverage obligations under a “continuous trigger” “all sums stacking” 
approach the obligations of underlying and overlaying insurers, whose 
policies are triggered by the “continuous trigger” theory, should be 
determined under a vertical rather than horizontal exhaustion approach. 
Adoption of horizontal exhaustion is not only inconsistent with the concept 
of the “giant uber-policy”, adoption of horizontal exhaustion puts of the 
insured’s entire coverage program at risk whenever any part of the program 
fails.
I. JUSTIFICATION FOR HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL 
EXHAUSTION BASED ON POLICY LANGUAGE 
Courts justify the application of either horizontal exhaustion or 
vertical exhaustion on two grounds: policy language and public policy; 
however, in this context the differences between the two grounds are not 
always well defined. Moreover, courts have not always been consistent in 
the treatment of policy language as supporting horizontal as opposed to 
vertical exhaustion. 
Some, but not all, courts have adopted vertical exhaustion when an 
overlaying level of coverage specifically identifies an underlying policy 
which has been exhausted. For example, in Viking Pump the New York 
Court of Appeals held that vertical exhaustion was called for when the 
overlaying policy referenced underlying policies as those “listed as an 
underlying policy in the declarations.”9 In that context, the overlaying policy 
was triggered upon the exhaustion of the described referenced policies 
without regard to the status of the other policies at the same layer of any of 
the referenced policies. 
Similarly, in State v. Continental Insurance Co., the appellate court 
stated that language in an excess insurance policy that liability attached upon 
an “Ultimate Net Loss” which referenced the specified retention “seems to 
be the very definition of vertical exhaustion.”10 
On the other hand, language that states the overlaying coverage is 
excess of [referenced policies] “and any other underlying insurance 
                                                          
9 In re Viking Pump, 52 N.E.3d 1144,1157 (N.Y. 2016). 
10 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 727 (Ct. App. 2017). 
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providing coverage to the insured” has been interpreted as calling for 
horizontal exhaustion.11 
In Montrose Chemical Corp. the court held that overlaying coverage 
that referenced specific coverage required horizontal exhaustion when the 
policy language specifically referenced a provision that incorporated “other 
underlying insurance.”12 The policy language, as restated by the court, 
provided: 
[T]he insurer agrees to pay on behalf of the insured the ultimate net 
loss in excess of the retained limit hereinafter stated.” The 
declarations then identify the underlying policies to which the 
American Centennial policies are specifically in excess (the 
“scheduled policies”).13 
The court noted the “Retained Limit” clause referred to the 
overlaying insurer’s liability as “excess of the identified underlying 
insurance and the applicable limits of any other underlying insurance 
collectible by the insured.14 While the court could have treated the 
conflicting language as ambiguous and resolved the conflict in the insured’s 
favor,15 the court chose to emphasize the broader language in the Retained 
                                                          
11 Montrose Chem. Corp., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 763 (discussing the 
American Centennial excess policies). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 764 (“The ‘retained limit’ clause: This clause provides: ‘[T]he 
company’s liability shall be only for the Ultimate net loss in excess of the 
insured’s retained limit defined as the greater of: []…the total of the 
applicable limits of the underlying policies listed in the [declarations] hereof, 
and applicable limits of any other underlying insurance collectible by the 
insured.’ (italics added.) This clause thus expressly states that the excess 
insurer’s liability is in excess of the identified insurance and the applicable 
limits of any other underlying insurance collectible by the insured.”). 
15 This is the rule of Contra Proferentum, or construction against the 
drafter. Often, but not always, courts will find that an inconsistency between 
insurance provisions in the same policy create ambiguity. That ambiguity is 
then resolved in the favor of the policyholder if a reasonable interpretation 
of the ambiguity so permits. 
270 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol.25 
Limits clause as supporting horizontal exhaustion because of the general 
reference to “other underlying insurance.”16 
The Montrose Chemical Corp. also found support for adoption of 
horizontal exhaustion when the overlaying policy references specific 
underlying coverage by looking at the overlaying policy’s “Other Insurance” 
clause, which provided that the overlaying policy was excess to “both 
scheduled and unscheduled policies.”17 However, this use of the “Other 
Insurance” clause language to support horizontal exclusion has been rejected 
by other courts as improper for several reason. First, “Other Insurance” 
clauses are seen by these courts as a means of allocating responsibility for a 
loss among insurers, not as a means of avoiding or deflecting liability to an 
insured.18 When the “continuous trigger” and “all sums stacking” approach 
is adopted, the insured’s entire coverage program is available to provide 
compensation for the loss. Allowing insurers to use the “Other Insurance” 
provision to escape or deflect their coverage obligations for a loss sustained 
by their common insured is inconsistent with the view that “Other Insurance” 
provisions are intended to prevent payments to the insured in excess of the 
                                                          
16 Montrose Chem. Corp., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 764 (italics in the 
original). 
17 Id. (“The ‘other insurance’ clause : This clause states: “ ‘If other 
collectible insurance…is available to the insured covering a loss also covered 
hereunder (except insurance purchased to apply in excess of the sum of the 
retained limit and the limit of liability hereunder) the insurance hereunder 
shall be in excess of and not contribute with, such other insurance.’ ” This 
clause thus provides that the American Centennial policies are excess to both 
scheduled and unscheduled policies.). 
18 See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co., supra note 5, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 727 
(collecting California decisions); cf. Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Product 
Sales & Marketing, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 407 (Ct. App. 2000): 
The other-insurance clause, as we have seen, does not excuse the 
insurer from discharging its independent obligation to indemnify the 
insured up to policy limits, though it gives the insurer a right to an 
adjudication allocating the indemnity obligation between it and the 
other insurer. 
The court added that the insurer’s use of the “Other Insurance” clause to 
deflect its obligations will support a jury’s determination of ‘bad faith.” 
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loss, consistent with the principle of indemnity.19 When the “Other 
Insurance” clause purports to require exhaustion of other available insurance 
before the policy may be accessed, the “Other Insurance” clause is typically 
referred to as an “excess” or “escape” type provision. “Escape” and “Excess” 
type provisions create difficulties because the other available insurance 
policy(ies) may also have “escape” or “excess” type “Other Insurance” 
clauses, which results in mutual repugnancy.20 
Second, and more generally accepted, many courts limit the use of 
“Other Insurance” clauses to insurers providing the same layer or level of 
coverage.21 Using the “Other Insurance” clause as a justification for 
horizontal exclusion is not consistent with this limitation because horizontal 
exhaustion requires exhaustion of underlying layers of coverage, which are 
clearly not at the same layer or level of coverage as the policy containing the 
“Other Insurance” clause.22 Courts relying on the “other Insurance” clause 
                                                          
19 See ROBERT E. KEETON, ALAN I. WIDISS & JAMES M. FISCHER, 
INSURANCE LAW § 3.11, at 217 (2d ed. 2016) (“Duplication of coverage 
raises the prospect that the indemnity principle will be violated. Other 
Insurance Provisions seek to ameliorate duplicate coverage so that indemnity 
principle is preserved.”) (footnote omitted). 
20 Dart Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 52 P.3d 79, 93 (Cal. 
2002) (“[P]ublic policy disfavors ‘escape’ clauses, whereby coverage 
purports to evaporate in the presence of other insurance. This disfavor should 
also apply, to a lesser extent, to excess-only clauses, by which carriers seek 
exculpation whenever the loss falls within another carrier’s policy limit.”) 
21 In re Viking Pump, 52 N.E.3d 1144, 1157 (N.Y. 2016) (“[W]e stated 
in Consolidated Edison that ‘other insurance’ clauses’ apply when two or 
more policies provide coverage during the same period, and they serve to 
prevent multiple recoveries from such policies, “and that such clauses ‘have 
nothing to do’ with whether any coverage potentially exist[s] at all among 
certain high-level policies that were in force during successive 
years.”)(citation omitted). 
22 See KEETON, WIDISS & FISCHER, supra note 19, at 220. See also Dart 
Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 52 P.3d 79, 93 (Cal. 
2002)(“[H]istorically, ‘other insurance’ clauses were designed to prevent 
multiple recoveries when more than one policy provided coverage for a 
particular loss. On the other hand, ‘other insurance’ clauses that attempt to 
shift the burden away from one primary insurer wholly or largely to other 
insurers have been the objects of judicial distrust. Public policy disfavors 
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as supporting the adoption of horizontal exhaustion have not explained 
affirmatively why the “Other Insurance” clause should be applied to different 
layers of insurance.23 
Many courts have stated that a particular form of exhaustion is 
required based on precedent.24 This argument, however, begs the question as 
to why the initial decision that constitutes the precedent was made in the first 
place. Horizontal exhaustion has been justified as consistent with the price 
differential between primary and excess coverage.25 This appears, however, 
to more an assertion than a justification. Price reflects the actuarial 
assessment that the covered risk will occur. Unless we know the underlying 
actuarial assessments, we cannot determine what the price specifically 
envisions as to risk.26 Some courts have justified adoption of horizontal 
exhaustion as necessary to prevent insureds from manipulating the sources 
of recovery and ignoring the distinctions between primary and excess 
insurance.27 Again, these appear to be more in the nature of assertions rather 
than reasoned arguments as courts making these arguments have not 
identified instances of manipulation nor reasons why horizontal exhaustion 
                                                          
escape clauses, whereby coverage purports to evaporate in the presence of 
other insurance. This disfavor should also apply to a lesser extent, to excess-
only clauses, by which carriers seek exculpation whenever the loss falls 
within another carrier’s policy limit. Partly for this reason, the modern trend 
is to require equitable contributions on a pro rate basis from all primary 
insurers regardless of the type of ‘other insurance’ clause in their 
policies.”(citations omitted)). 
23 E.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 
767 (Ct. App. 2017) (distinguishing a prior decision that contained language 
that “Other Insurance” clauses only applied to allocations among insurers 
and should not be used to deflect insurer coverage obligations). 
Distinguishing a prior decision is not, however, the same as affirmatively 
demonstrating the soundness of the position reached. 
24 See Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
25 See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 801, 809 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1997). 
26 Applying horizontal exhaustion to primary layers of coverage may be 
justified because of the defense obligation that attaches at the primary level 
and which is reflected in the risk assumed by primary insurers. See infra 
notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
27 See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 
1261 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994). 
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is more congruent with the primary-excess distinction than vertical 
exhaustion. 
The claim has been made that vertical exhaustion should be adopted 
because it is most consistent with the “All Sums” method of allocation that 
has been adopted by most jurisdictions to address coverage obligations under 
the continuous trigger doctrine.28 While courts have not explained why 
vertical exhaustion is most consistent with the “All Sums” approach,29 an 
explanation may lie in the third reason courts have given for adopting a 
particular exhaustion approach for reasons other than policy language. That 
reason is complexity. It becomes exceedingly difficult to determine how 
overlaying coverage should be accessed when the insurance plan extends 
over a lengthy period of time, and the doctrine in the jurisdiction holds all 
that policies have been triggered – creating the so-called “Uber” policy.30 
Consider for example the problem of uneven layers of insurance described 
in Schematic 2, on page 274, where some policy periods have 7 layers of 
coverage; other policy periods have 5 layers of coverage, etc. More 
importantly, the layers of coverage have different limits. For example, in 
year 3, Insurer J has $19 million of coverage over an underlying primary 
layer, provided by Insurer L, of $1 million. In year 5, two successive insurers, 
                                                          
28 See Viking Pump, 52 N.E.3d at 1156 (collecting decisions); see also 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS., §§ 42 cmt. c, 44 cmt. c (Proposed 
Final Draft 2017). 
29 In some respects, the problem may be one of framing. For example, in 
Schematic 1, should the insurance provided by the nine insurers be seen as 
coverage (singular) or as coverages (plural)? If the entire program of 
insurance is seen as an integrated package of insurance (the “uber” policy), 
it may be easier to visualize coverage as rising evenly from bottom to top 
(horizontal exhaustion) than spiking as individual coverages are exhausted 
(vertical exhaustion). 
30 Courts that adopt horizontal exhaustion tend to put this concern in the 
“never mind” category. See Montrose Chem. Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr.3d at 1335-
36 (“Montrose argues finally that mandatory horizontal exhaustion is 
‘unworkable in practice’ because of the complexity of its coverage portfolio. 
We do not doubt that allocating more than $200 million in liability across 
more than 100 policies covering nearly 25 years is likely to be a complicated 
process. The complexity, however, is not relevant to our analysis, as we 
cannot, in the service of expediency, impose obligations that are inconsistent 
with the terms of the contracts Montrose itself negotiated.”). 
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Insurers S and T, provided the same amount of coverage over an underlying 
layer of coverage, provided by Insurer R. How would Insurer S and T’s 
obligations be triggered? Is Insurer T a second layer or third layer insurer for 
purposes of horizontal exhaustion? If overlaying policies are simply 
triggered as underlying dollar amounts, e.g., $1 million, $5 million, $10 
million, etc. are reached, the internal structure of coverage within each policy 
year is compromised. If each layer within a policy period must await the 
exhaustion of the underlying layer, regardless of total losses within the 
triggered policy periods, the metaphor of a rising tide is an illusion.31 
Schematic 2 
$50 Million       $50 Million 
$40 Million 
 
  
Insurer 
P 
Insurer 
U 
Insurer 
CC $40 Million 
$30 Million 
 
 
Insurer 
O 
Insurer 
BB $30 Million 
$20 Million Insurer H 
Insurer 
K 
Insurer 
AA $20 Million 
$15 Million 
Insurer 
D 
 
 
Insurer 
G 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insurer 
J 
Insurer 
T 
Insurer 
Z $15 Million 
$10 Million Insurer Y $10 Million 
$5 Million Insurer C 
Insurer 
N Insurer 
S 
Insurer 
X $5 Million 
$1 Million Insurer B 
Insurer 
F 
 Insurer 
W $1 Million 
 Insurer 
A 
Insurer 
E 
Insurer 
L 
Insurer 
M 
Insurer 
R 
Insurer 
V  
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6  
Another problem with implementing horizontal exhaustion is that 
policy limits within the various layers of the insured’s coverage program 
may be uneven from year to year. For example, in year 1, the 4th layer of 
                                                          
31 Another example of this concern is provided by Westport Ins. Corp. 
v. Appleton Papers, Inc. 787 N.W. 2d 894, 918-19 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). 
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coverage provided by Insurer D attaches at $10 million; in year 4 the 4th 
layer of coverage attaches at $40 million. Similarly, in years 1, 2, 3, 5, and 
6, the primary layer provides $1 million in coverage, but in year 4, the 
coverage provided by Insurer M is $5 million. Rather than coverage being 
distributed evenly by layer and amount through the 6-year coverage period, 
insurance coverage is unevenly distributed both as to the number of layers 
of coverage, the amounts of insurance coverage provided in the individual 
policies, and the aggregate amount of insurance provided in each policy year. 
Exhausting underlying coverage horizontally across uneven towers of 
coverage can prove to be a daunting task.32 
A second reason for rejecting horizontal exhaustion on policy 
ground is that it contains a disguised forfeiture feature: The more coverage 
an insured purchases, the greater the risk much of the coverage will be lost 
due to the inability to fully exhaust one of the policies in the coverage 
program. 
Consider for example, the coverage program set out in Schematic 2. 
If the insured only purchases coverage for year 1, the year 1 coverage is 
defined by the coverages provided by Insurers A, B, C, and D. If, however, 
the insured acquires coverage in year 2, the insured’s ability to access the 
coverage provided by Insurers B, C, and D is now controlled by the need to 
exhaust the coverages provided by Insurers E, F, G, and H. The problem 
continues as the insured continues the coverage program into year 6. Now 
the coverage provided by Insurers B, C, and D is subject to being lost if the 
insured does not fully exhaust the coverage provided by Insurers V, W, X, 
Y, Z, etc. Under the horizontal exhaustion approach the failure to exhaust 
the policy coverage provided by Insurer V puts all of the coverage for all of 
the years at risk. That is a forfeiture, plain and simple. There is no sound 
reason why coverage in place (e.g., year 1) should be subject to subsequent 
events (e.g., coverage placed in year 6). Courts that have adopted horizontal 
exhaustion have assumed all they are resolving is how the sequencing of 
policies in place will be accessed. These courts have ignored, or failed to 
fully consider, the significant likelihood that a policy will not be exhausted 
and how that failure will affect the insured’s ability to access other triggered 
policies. And as shown in Parts II through V of this paper, the likelihood that 
                                                          
32 Insurance towers of coverage may be extensive. Appendix A to this 
illustrates the insurance coverage program of an insured that was involved 
in coverage litigation involving a toxic waste site. See State v. Cont’l Ins. 
Co., 15 Cal. App. 5th 1017, 1047-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
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a policy in the insured’s coverage program will not be fully exhausted is a 
real and present danger. In effect, the horizontal exhaustion doctrine operates 
as a hidden bomb that when detonated by the inability to exhaust a single 
policy, compromised the entire coverage program.33  Horizontal exhaustion 
kills coverage while preserving the illusion of coverage. The unappreciated 
consequence of horizontal exhaustion is that the more coverage an insured 
obtains, the less likely it becomes that the insurance purchased will be 
available to the insured when a loss occurs. 
II. SETTLEMENT AND EXHAUSTION OF UNDERLYING 
LIMITS 
A recurring issue today is the effect of a settlement between an 
insured and an underlying insurer on the overlaying insurer when the 
settlement is for less than the underlying insurer’s policy limits. For example, 
in Schematic 2, assume Insurer M, with $5 million in limits, disputes 
coverage of the claim and the Insured and Insurer M agree to settle the 
dispute with a payment by Insurer M of $4 million. What affect, if any, does 
the settlement have on the coverage obligations of Insurers A through CC? 
When an insured settles a coverage dispute with an underlying 
insurer for less than the policy limits, overlaying insurers will claim that a 
condition of their coverage obligations – exhaustion by payment of policy 
limits of underlying coverage – has not been met. Excess insurers will also 
claim that payment or credit by the insured of any difference between the 
settlement amount and the policy limits will not satisfy the coverage 
condition in the overlaying policy, absent express policy language permitting 
the insured to cover. 
Not surprisingly, courts have differed whether the excess insurers’ 
position should be accepted. Many decisions today adopt a formal “follow 
the policy language” approach. Under this approach, the policy language 
determines whether the insured may access the excess insurance coverage 
by covering the gap between the settlement amount and the policy 
                                                          
33 Forfeiture of policy benefits is disfavored, and courts will generally 
construe policy terms and adopt rules of policy construction that avoid 
forfeiture of policy benefits. See COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 22:34-35 (3d ed. 
2017). See also Richmond v. Dart Indus, Inc., Cal 629 P.2d 23, where the 
California Supreme Court comments that coverage escapism by insurer use 
of “Other Insurance” clauses is disfavored. See supra note 20. The same 
sentiments apply to coverage escapism produced by horizontal exhaustion. 
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limits.34As, however, with almost all insurance claims, disputes may arise 
whether the policy language does permit the insured to access an overlaying 
level of coverage by paying the differences between the policy limits and the 
settlement amount. 
Consider, for example, policy language that simply requires 
exhaustion of an underlying policy by “actual payment.” Must the payment 
be made by the insurer in satisfaction of judgment or settlement, or may it 
be made by the insured? Again, courts have disagreed on this point.35 
When relying exclusively on policy language, very slight differences 
in policy language may result in a loss or preservation of excess insurance 
coverage when an insured settles a coverage dispute with an underlying 
insurer for less than the policy limits. For example, in Zeig v. Massachusetts 
Bonding & Ins. Co.,36 the court held that language in an excess insurance 
policy that conditioned access when the underlying policy was “exhausted 
in the payment of claims to the full amount of the expressed limits” permitted 
the insured to satisfy the requirement by a bridge payment.37 In Ali v. Federal 
                                                          
34  In some situation, the policy language explicitly permits the insured 
to cover the gap. See, e.g., Axis Excess D & O Policy, XS 0001 12 10: 
This policy shall provide insurance excess of the Underlying 
Insurance. Liability shall attach to the Insurer only after (i) the 
Insurers of the Underlying Insurance, the Insureds or others on 
behalf of the Insureds shall have paid in legal currency amounts 
covered under the respective Underlying Insurance equal to the full 
amount of the Underlying Limit… 
35 Cf. Forest Labs. Inc. v. Arch Ins. Co., 953 N.Y.S. 2d 460 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2012) (holding that “actual payment” language unambiguously requires 
payment by insurer to exhaust limits); with Maximus, Inc. v. Twin City Fire 
Ins. Co., 856 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Va. 2012) (holding that “actual payment” 
language was ambiguous and could be reasonably construed to permit 
bridging payment by insured to satisfy exhaustion requirement). By 
“bridging payment” I mean that the insured assumes the obligation to pay 
the difference between the policy limits and the amount of the settlement. 
36 Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F. 2d 665 (2d Cir. 1928). 
37 Id. at 666. Zieg involved a 1st party property insurance policy, which 
did not contain a duty to defend. A number of courts have distinguished Zeig 
on this ground and have refused to apply Zieg to 3d party liability insurance 
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Ins. Co., however, the court held that language in the excess insurance policy 
that conditioned access to the policy “only after…all Underlying Insurance 
has been exhausted by payment of claims…solely as a result of payment of 
losses thereunder” did not permit the insured to use a bridge payment to 
satisfy the condition of access to the excess insurance policy.38 
In many cases today, the policy language is quite clear that 
exhaustion must be accomplished by payments by the insurer.39 Of course, a 
consequence of treating payment by the insurer as the exclusive method of 
exhausting underlying coverage is that the insured loses overlaying 
insurance by settling a coverage dispute with the underlying insurer. A 
number of courts and commentators have argued that such a result imposes 
a forfeiture on the insured that is violative of public policy. Under this view, 
when the insured in good faith settles a coverage dispute with the underlying 
insurer for less than policy limits, that settlement should not cause the 
insured to lose the excess insurance in place when the overlaying insurers 
are not prejudiced.40 Alternatively, if the dispute is not resolved and the 
insurer prevails on the coverage dispute, that specific policy in the tower of 
coverage is not exhausted and, under the horizontal exhaustion approach, the 
entire coverage program collapses from that point upward. 
The problem is compounded in the continuous trigger context when 
the issue is whether the court should apply either horizontal exhaustion or 
vertical exhaustion. If vertical exhaustion is adopted and an “insurer-only” 
payment requirement is enforced, the insured’s coverage losses are limited 
to the policy period in which the particular underlying policy is situated. For 
                                                          
coverages, such as the involved in most cases where the “continuous trigger” 
“all sums stacking” approach is applied. See text and notes 40-46, where the 
issue of horizontal exhaustion in the duty to defend context is discussed. 
38 Ali v. Federal Ins. Co., 719 F. 3d 83 (2d Cir. 2013). 
39 See, e.g., Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 
73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (4 Cir. 2008). The policy provided: “Underwriters shall 
be liable only after the insurers under each of the Underlying policies have 
paid or have been held liable to pay the full amount of the Underlying Limit 
of Liability.” Id. at 778. The court held that the policy language did not 
permit the insured to make a bridging payment to allow access to the excess 
insurance coverage. Id. at 774-75. 
40 See generally Jeffrey W. Stemple, An Analytical “Gap”: The Perils 
of Relentless Enforcement of Payment–by-Underlying–Insurer–Only 
Language in Excess Insurance Policies, 52 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 
807, 863 (2017) (criticizing judicial willingness to enforce “insurer-only” 
payment language as unfair to insureds and as unduly protective of insurers). 
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example, in Schematic 2, if the insured settled a coverage dispute with 
Insurer A for less than policy limits, the immediate consequences would be 
limited to year 1 coverages if only the coverages in place for that policy year 
are in play. If horizontal exhaustion is required, the consequences of the 
settlement may now spread into years 2 through 6. The insurers providing 
overlaying coverage in years 2 through 6 can now claim that their coverages 
are not triggered because all underlying insurance has not been exhausted by 
the payment of policy limits. Thus, not only does the tower of coverage in 
the specific policy period collapse, but application of horizontal exhaustion 
results in the entire insurance program, covering all the triggered policies, 
collapsing. 
There is no substantial reason to permit the insurers in years 2 
through 6 to withhold coverage based upon the resolution of a year 1 
coverage dispute. Insurers B through D may be seen to have contracted that 
their obligations would be conditioned on the full performance by Insurer A 
of its obligations. That concession cannot be comfortably extended to the 
years 2 through 6 insurers except through a very generous reading of “Other 
Insurance” or similar provisions that may generally reference other 
underlying policies. Allowing the year 2 through 6 insurers to claim the 
settlement as a defense to payment by them renders the “uber” policy 
illusory. Similarly, horizontal exhaustion allows insurers B through D to 
defer their coverage obligations until exhaustion of underlying coverage in 
years 2 through 6, coverage that was not in existence at the time insurers B 
through D placed their coverage. There is no reason why Insurers B through 
D should be allowed to escape their coverage obligations based on coverages 
obtained by their insured after the B through D policies were obtained. 
Surely such actions by the insured are completely fortuitous to the decision 
by insurers B through D to provide coverage to the insured. Any settlement 
by an insured of a coverage dispute with one insurer would require the 
unanimous consent of all insurers whose policies have been triggered by the 
insured event to not treat the settlement as affecting other coverages. And 
because refusal to consent would preserve a complete coverage defense, 
every overlaying insurer would be incentivized to withhold consent. 
Horizontal exclusion would in this context provide a windfall to 
insurers that cannot be justified by any underwriting or policy 
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considerations.41 A good faith settlement between the insured and an insurer 
promotes the efficient resolution of disputes and is consistently recognized 
as a desirable goal of civil adjudication. Therefore, to the extent courts would 
recognize and enforce “insurer-only” payment requirements, courts should 
not impose a horizontal exhaustion requirement, particularly in the 
continuous trigger, successive coverage context where doing so would allow 
all overlaying insurers to escape coverage obligations based on a single 
failure to pay policy limits by any single underlying insurer. 
One consideration might, however, militate in favor of allowing 
overlaying insurers to withhold coverage when an underlying insurer has 
failed to completely exhaust its policy limits. This occurs when the 
underlying insurer has defense obligations, the cost of which are not credited 
against policy limits.42 In such a case, overlaying insurer may claim they 
have bargained for two layers of protection, (1) an indemnity protection 
based on policy limits, and (2) an unlimited defense obligation until the 
policy limits have been exhausted. 
In the usual case, an overlaying insurer reasonably expects that 
defense costs will be borne by the underlying insurer until the underlying 
                                                          
41 See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 718 A.2d 1116, 1123 
(N.J. 1998) (rejecting insurer proposed horizontal exhaustion in continuous 
trigger, successive coverage context). 
42 In liability coverages defense costs are traditionally paid pursuant to 
the Supplemental Payments provision of the policy and are not charged 
against the policy’s indemnity limits. See KEETON, WIDISS & FISCHER, 
INSURANCE LAW § 8.1(e), at 790 (2d ed. 2016). The major exception to this 
principle occurs with respect to professional liability coverages where all or 
a portion of the insurer’s cost of defending the insured may be offset against 
the insurer’s indemnity obligation. Id. at n.51; see generally JERRY & 
RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 111[K] (4th ed. 2017). 
Defense costs can be substantial. See, e.g., Biomass One, L.P., v. Imperial 
Cas. & Indem. Co., 968 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (Table) (noting that in 
defending policy’s indemnity limits of $2 million, defense costs of $1.9 
million had been incurred); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Imperial Cas. 
& Indem. Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 46-47 (2nd Cir. 2000) (noting several 
instances where defense costs associated with the defense of specific 
contamination claims exceeded indemnity limits by a factor of 
approximately 2.5, e.g., policy limits of $1 million and defense costs in 
excess of $2 million; moreover, in each case the defense costs substantially 
exceeded the indemnity costs actually paid, in two of the instances by a factor 
of ten). 
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policy is exhausted by payment of judgments and settlements. A within 
limits settlement of a coverage dispute between the insured and an 
underlying insurer effectively denies the overlaying insurer this measure of 
protection. And, as many courts have noted, the presence of a defense 
obligation correlates with the price differential between underlying (primary, 
or working, layer of coverage) and overlaying coverages.43 Allowing an 
underlying insurer to escape its defense obligations may be seen as unfair to 
the overlaying insurer, which has relied on the underlying policy’s defense 
obligation in pricing the overlaying policy. Simply allowing the insured to 
pay (or credit) the difference between the indemnity limits and the amount 
actually received from the underlying insurer does not fully make the 
overlaying insurer whole because that payment (or credit) does not reflect 
defense payments that would have been borne by the underlying insurer until 
the indemnity limits were, in fact, fully exhausted by payment of judgments 
or settlements. This consideration is limited to defense costs and does not 
extend to indemnity obligations that accrue as a result of settlement or 
judgment. 
The proposed Restatement addresses this issue in a slightly different 
manner. It notes that the premium changed by overlaying insurers may be 
based on the expectation that underlying insurers will more competently 
evaluate and resolve claims using policy money than will insureds using their 
own money.44 But this distinction between insurer and insured acumen 
amounts to little if does not encompass the defense obligation, which is 
generally unlimited and not tied to the policy limits. A rational overlaying 
insurer may reasonably expect the great majority of claims to be resolved 
within the policy limits as long as defense costs are excluded from the 
                                                          
43 See, e.g., Ali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 719 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.), Inc., 649 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 2011)); See 
also Zurich Ins. Co. v. The Heil Co., 815 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1987); 
See also Maricopa Cty. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 308, 310 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1988). 
44 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIA. INS. §42 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016). The reasoning behind the Restatement’s 
position is debatable. One would think insureds would be as careful with 
their money as insurers are with their money in the contexts where the 
“continuous trigger” is most often used – mass torts implicating large, 
sophisticated insureds who often have risk professionals and platoons of 
lawyers to advise them. 
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calculation. This expectation is reflected in the cost differential between 
primary and excess insurance45 and the value consistently recognized by 
courts and commentators that the insurer’s defense obligation provides 
insureds.46 
While the costs of the defense clearly affect the pricing of primary 
and excess coverages, it would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on 
that fact in the “continuous trigger” “all sums stacking” context. When 
coverage involves only a single policy period (concurrent coverage), an 
overlaying excess insurer has a legitimate interest in the assumption of 
defenses cost by the underlying insurer providing primary coverage. 
Whether that duty is discharged by the primary insurer or the insured should 
be irrelevant, unless the overlaying insurer can demonstrate actual prejudice 
                                                          
45 For example, in Schmitz v. Great Am. Assur. Co., 337 S.W.3d 700 
(Mo. 2011), the court noted that the primary policy (with $1 million policy 
limits) cost $8,386, while the excess policy (with $4 million policy limits) 
cost $4,000. 
46 See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287,  
295-96 (Cal. 1993) (“The insured’s desire to secure the right to call on the 
insurer’s superior resources for the defense of third party claims is, in all 
likelihood, typically as significant a motive for the purchase of insurance as 
is the wish to obtain indemnity for possible liability. As a consequence, 
California courts have been consistently solicitous of insureds’ expectations 
on this score.”); Eileen B Eglin & Stephen D. Straus, Classifying RI/FS Costs 
under a Policy of Comprehensive General Liability Insurance or Defense, 5 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV., 385 at 387 (2011) (“Depending upon the policy 
language, defense costs will either count towards the stated coverage limit 
of the policy or they will be exclusive of the limit. Under a cost-exclusive 
policy, the insurer’s coverage obligation has the potential to be far greater 
than the stated indemnity limit. This is because defense costs in a cost-
exclusive policy will not serve to impair the liability limit; only payments 
for damages in the form of judgments or settlements impair or exhaust the 
limits of a cost-exclusive policy. Defense costs under a cost- exclusive CGL 
policy can eclipse the stated policy limit where no settlements or judgements 
equaling the limits are sustained.”); See also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & 
DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 577 (6th ed. 2015) 
(“Most primary liability insurance policies not only provide indemnity to the 
insured; they also provide the right to a defense of all claims alleging liability 
that would be covered by the policy if the allegations were true. This 
coverage provides important ‘litigation insurance,’ since the costs of 
defending against even unsuccessful lawsuits can be substantial.”) 
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if the defense is maintained by the primary insurer or the insured. In the 
“continuous trigger” context, however, the loss of a primary policy with a 
defense obligation, does not affect the obligation of other primary insurers 
to provide a defense. Courts has consistently recognized the primacy of the 
duty to defend in this context; therefore, any and all insurers in the 
“continuous trigger” context, whose policies contain a defense obligation, 
must provide a defense if their policy is triggered. Thus, failure of a primary 
insurer to provide a defense is unlikely to have an impact on an overlaying 
insurer because a complete defense will be provided by the other primary 
insurers. Permitting an overlying insurer to escape its indemnity obligations 
because one or even several underlying insurers failed to provide a defense 
would be a complete exaltation of form over substance in the “continuous 
trigger” context. 
Some courts have suggested that concern over collusion between an 
insured and an underlying insurer is an independent justification for 
requiring actual payment of indemnity limits by an insurer to exhaust the 
policy. For example, in Ali v. Federal Insurance Company the court 
distinguished Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company on the 
ground that Zeig involved a property insurance loss that became fixed when 
it occurred. Ali, on the other hand, involved liability insurance coverage 
(Directors & Officers policy), which involved the insureds “obligations to 
pay third parties.” The Ali court agreed with the lower court that this 
obligation to pay could incentivize the insured and its underlying insurers to 
structure settlements manipulatively to move payment away from the 
underlying insurers and to the overlaying insurers.47 
As a speculative proposition, it is, of course, possible that an insured 
could collude with one of its insurers to the prejudice of another of its 
insurers. Instances of this occurring have been reported,48 and, if it occurs it 
seemingly would more likely occur between an insured and an insurer the 
insured had a working relationship with, e.g., the primary layer insurer, and 
to the prejudice of an insurer the insured had only a distant relationship with, 
e.g., an excess insurer somewhere in the tower of coverage provided by the 
                                                          
47 Ali, 719 F.3d at 93-94. 
48 See e.g., Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 153 
Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (involving collusion between 
insured and primary insurer to allocate dates of loss to transfer loss exposure 
away from primary insurer and onto excess insurer). 
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insurance coverage program. That said, it is difficult to conceive of factual 
scenarios involving collusion that do not involve allowing an underlying 
insurer to escape its defense obligation. If only indemnity is involved, 
allowing the underlying insurer to buy its way out of coverage does not 
financially impact an overlaying insurer because to preserve the overlaying 
insurance the insured with have to assume the discharged insurer’s indemnity 
obligation in some manner, e.g., by payment (or credit) up to the underlying 
limits. Thus, a less than limits payment by an underlying insurer has no 
financial consequences to an overlaying insurer insofar as indemnity is 
concerned because the overlaying insurer will receive a credit against the 
loss equal to any difference between the policy limits and the insured-insurer 
coverage settlement. For example, using Schematic 1, assume Insurer Alpha, 
with indemnity limits of $1 million, settles a coverage dispute with the 
insured for a payment of $500,000. The claimant and the insured settle a 
dispute (which only affects the year 1 policies) for $2 million. Assume 
further, the Epsilon policy has $3 million policy limits. Epsilon would pay 
$1 million. This reflects the full value of underlying insurance ($1 million) 
being credited against the settlement. 
This suggests that concern over collusion and manipulation of 
settlements is misguided. Aside from avoidance of defense costs, insureds 
and underlying insurers have little or no reason to collude because they are 
not actually exporting any of their costs to overlaying insurers. Protecting an 
overlaying insurers’ reliance on underlying insurers absorbing defense costs 
until their policy limits are exhausted by payment of judgments or 
settlements is not a standalone justification for not treating a within limits 
settlement between an insured and insurer as exhausting the limits. As noted 
earlier, the defense will be provided by other primary insurers or the insured 
so that the overlaying insurer is not prejudiced. A focus on collusion or 
manipulation adds nothing to the analysis whether the overlaying insurance 
should be deemed to be “triggered” with respect to excess coverage 
obligations. 
III. EXHAUSTION OF COVERAGE THROUGH NON-
CUMMULATION/PRIOR INSURANCE PROVISIONS 
Non-Cumulation/Prior Insurance provisions refer to insurance 
policy terms that provide that the applicable policy limits may be offset by 
insurance under another policy available to the insured. Non-
Cumulation/Prior Insurance provisions are similar to “Other Insurance” 
provisions in that both seek to reduce the insurer’s obligations when the 
insured is also an insured under other insurance policies that cover the same 
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insured event. Many courts, however, limit the application of “Other 
Insurance” provisions to insurers on the same risk in the same policy period 
and refuse to apply the provision in cases of successive coverage.49 Non-
Cumulation/Prior Insurance provisions are said to address (from the insurer’s 
vantage point) the problem raised by the “continuous trigger” “all sums 
stacking” approach.50 Non-Cumulation/Prior Insurance provisions allow the 
insurer to use payments owed or made under prior policies that apply to the 
same risk under a continuous trigger to reduce obligations owed under other 
policies made applicable to the risk by the same continuous trigger. For 
example, looking at Schematic 3, on page 286, assume under “continuous 
trigger” “all sums stacking” Insurer Beta’s year 1, year 2, and year 4 policies 
have all been triggered. A Non-Cumulation/Prior Insurance provision is 
intended by the insurer (here Beta) to allow it to offset payments made by it 
from policies at the same layer of coverage. For example, a payment of $1 
million on the year 1, 1st layer excess Beta policy would be credited against 
the year 4, 1st layer Beta policy. Thus, instead of Beta paying $1 million on 
each policy, or $2 million total, Beta would pay only $1 million on both 
policies. The result would be to negate “all sums stacking.” Courts have 
enforced Non-Cumulation/Prior Insurance provisions when the payments are 
made by the same insurer51 and when made by different insurers.52  On the 
other hand, a number of courts have refused to enforce Non-
                                                          
49 See Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Ins. Co., 564 F.3d 1192, 1196-97 
(10th Cir. 2009) (collecting conflicting authorities). The court certified the 
question to the Utah Supreme Court which held that “Other Insurance” 
provisions did not apply to successive insurers on the same risk. Ohio Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Unigard Ins. Co., 268 P.3d 180, 183 (Utah 2012); see also In re 
Viking Pump, 52 N.E.3d 1144, 1157 (N.Y. 2016) (same). 
50 See Viking Pump, 52 N.E.3d at 1152. The court noted that Non-
Cummulation/Prior Insurance provisions are not applicable when a 
jurisdiction adopts the “pro-rata” rather than the “all sums with stacking” 
method of allocation because under “pro rata” allocation the insurer is only 
liable under each triggered policy for that portion of the total loss that 
occurred in the particular policy’s period of coverage. Id. at 1153. 
51 Olin Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 704 F.3d 89, 102-104 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (applying New York law) (Olin III). 
52 Olin Corp. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 864 F.3d 130, 151 (2d Cir. 
2017) (applying New York law)(Olin IV). 
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Cumulation/Prior Insurance provisions, usually on the ground that the 
provision is ambiguous.53 
Schematic 3 
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Although Non-Cumulation/Prior Insurance provisions, when 
enforced, may have their greatest impact on the selection of a continuous 
trigger allocation method,54 the provisions also may influence the exhaustion 
method adopted by the court. The adoption of the “all sums stacking” 
approach, because of the presence of a Non- Cumulation /Prior Insurance 
provision, encourages the adoption of vertical exhaustion over horizontal 
exhaustion.55 If the excess insurance policy expressly provides that its limits 
are reduced by other payments, those other payments determine whether the 
excess insurance is available. Requiring exhaustion of all underlying 
insurance simply adds an additional requirement that is inconsistent with the 
explicit requirements of the Non- Cumulation /Prior Insurance provision 
because exhaustion here simply duplicates what is accomplished by an 
                                                          
53 A.B.S. Clothing Collection, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
166, 170-173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
54 As noted previously, many courts find that the presence of a non-
cumulation/ prior-insurance provision in a policy is inconsistent with an 
insurer’s claim that “pro rata” allocation should be adopted. As noted in In 
re Viking Pump: 
[P]olicies containing non-cumulation clauses or non-cumulation 
and prior insurance provisions…all sums is the appropriate 
allocation method….[I]t would be inconsistent with the language of 
the non-cumulation causes to use pro rata allocation here.  
52 N.E.3d 1144, 1153 (N.Y. 2016). 
55 Id. at 1156 (stating that “vertical exhaustion is conceptually consistent 
with an all sums allocation”). 
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enforceable Non Cumulation/Prior Insurance provision. If, on the other 
hand, horizontal exhaustion is applied, a question may arise whether a policy 
that is not fully paid, because of credits applied from other policy payouts, 
has been exhausted. Overlaying insurers will likely argue that a credit does 
not constitute “actual payment” of policy limits by payment of judgments or 
settlements. The presence of Non- Cumulation /Prior Insurance provisions, 
thus, will likely complicate accessing the insured’s total coverage program. 
And, if the credit is not treated as an “actual payment,” application of a Non- 
Cumulation /Prior Insurance provision may possibly foreclose recovery from 
the overlaying policies due to non-exhaustion of the underlying policy. 
IV. INSOLVENCY OF UNDERLYING INSURERS 
Insolvency has been addressed most commonly in “continuous 
trigger” coverage contexts in the area of allocation.56 It also arises in the more 
traditional context of the overlaying insurer’s “drop down” obligations, 
which typically involves a single policy period containing a single tower of 
coverage, i.e., concurrent coverage.57 There has been relatively little judicial 
                                                          
56 See John T. Waldron & Sara N. Brown, New Jersey Allocation Law: 
How to Calculate Solvent and Insolvent Insurers Pro-Rata Shares for Long-
Tail Claims, 50 TORT TRIAL & INS. L. J. 747 (2015).   
57 See, e.g., Mission Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 792 F.2d 550 
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding that insolvency of underlying insurer did not trigger 
obligation on the part of overlaying insurer to assume the insured’s 
defense). This issue has generated substantial judicial disagreement in older 
decisions when there was more variation in coverage language. Cf. Reserve 
Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982) (holding that policy language 
triggering overlaying insurers duty to assume the insured’s defense, when 
“amount recoverable” under the underlying policy was paid, was ambiguous 
and could be reasonably understood to trigger overlaying insurer’s obligation 
when insolvent underlying insurer paid all that it could, even though that 
amount was less than policy limits); with Moorpark Indus. Inc. v. W. Emps. 
Ins. Co., 429 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that term 
“amount reasonable” is not ambiguous); see generally Jane M. Draper, 
Annotation, Primary Insurer’s Insolvency as Affecting Excess Insurer’s 
Liability, 85 A.L.R.4th 729, 757-63 (1991) (collecting conflicting decisions 
whether term “amount recoverable” is ambiguous). See id. at 763-75. 
Modern policies do not use the phrase “amount recoverable” to trigger 
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discussion of the effect of insolvency on the obligations of overlaying 
insurers when a “continuous trigger” is applied with the result that coverage 
is successive rather than just concurrent. That is somewhat surprising given 
the fact that insurer insolvency will likely be encountered in the “continuous 
trigger” context given the financial demands continuous trigger theories 
place on insurers, particularly when “all sums stacking” is imposed.58 
Traditionally, an indemnity obligation required the payment of the 
debt for the indemnity to be triggered. Thus, if B was indebted to A and C 
agreed to indemnity B, A’s ability to compel C to perform required that B 
sustain a loss. If B was insolvent, C could escape because B sustained no 
loss, being insolvent. Such a rule would be beneficial to insurers, who 
traditionally occupy the role of C, while their insureds occupy the role of B; 
however, most states and standard form policy language have taken this 
defense away.59 Those statutes and policy language apply, however, only 
when the Bs (insureds) of the world become insolvent. What happens when 
the Cs of the world (insurers) become insolvent? 
Standard form primary policy language does not directly address 
insurer insolvency; therefore, the issue is usually addressed by examining 
the policy language that activates the overlaying coverage. In this sense the 
issue of insurer insolvency is similar to the issues raised by settlements 
between the insured and an insurer for less than policy limits discussed in 
Part II of this paper. Does the settlement (here, insurer insolvency) satisfy a 
requirement in the overlaying policy that conditions coverage on (1) the 
                                                          
coverage; rather, they use the phrased “reduced or exhausted by payment,” 
or a variant of the phrase, which is generally interpreted to require exhaustion 
by payment of the policy’s actual, stated limits.  See id. at 746-57. The term 
“collectible,” which some courts have found to be “ambiguous” is still, 
however, used in many excess policies. 
58 I could not find any data supporting or disproving this assumption. 
There is no disagreement, however, that adoption of continuous triggers has 
significantly increased insurer financial obligations to insureds. If it didn’t 
insureds would not press for it and insurers would not fight tooth and nail 
against it! Adam Raphael’s book Ultimate Risk does attribute Lloyds 
financial crisis in the 1990’s in significant part to mass tort claims that, 
through the continuous trigger theory, allowed insureds to aggregate 
coverage for particular losses across multiple policy periods.  
59 See David Gray Carson, Indemnity, Liability, Insolvency, 25 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1951 (2004) (discussing distinction between indemnity and liability 
obligations when the obligor becomes insolvent). 
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exhaustion of limits by payment of judgments or settlements or (2) for 
“ultimate net loss” in excess of underlying scheduled or other insurance? 
Courts have split as to whether insurer insolvency will result in the 
inability to satisfy an “ultimate net loss” provision. Much turns on the 
specific language of the provision and the willingness of a court to deem the 
provision clear or ambiguous. For example, in Reserve Insurance Company 
v. Piscotta, the California Supreme Court held that “ultimate net loss” 
language that was tied to the “amount recoverable” was not expressly tied to 
policy limits; therefore, the insolvency of an underlying insurer required that 
the overlaying insurer “drop down” and provide coverage.60 Not all courts, 
however, agree with this construction of the phrase “amount recoverable” as 
ambiguous.61 
In most instances, insurers use language in the “ultimate net loss” 
clause that courts deem reasonably informs the insured that only full 
payment of the underlying limits will allow the insured to access the 
overlaying insurance; consequently, the insolvency of an underlying insurer 
is often a risk that is borne by the insured, not the overlaying insurer(s). For 
example, in Mission National Insurance Company v. Duke Transportation 
Company, the overlaying insurer (Mission) conditioned its coverage “to the 
ultimate net loss the excess of…the limits of the underlying insurance as set 
out in the attached schedule…”62 As a result of the insolvency of the 
underlying insurer (Northwest), that attachment threshold could not be met. 
The insured (Duke) argued that this event (insolvency) meant that Mission’s 
obligations became immediate. In other words, because Northwest could no 
longer perform its obligations, Northwest’s obligations should be deemed to 
have been performed. The court rejected this argument holding that 
Northwest’s insolvency did not excuse the policy requirement that losses as 
specified be paid before Mission’s obligations would be activated.63 
Thus, initially at least, “insolvent insurers cases” tract “settlement 
within coverage limits” cases. In both cases, the critical issue is whether the 
                                                          
60 Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764, discussed in note 57. In effect, one reasonable 
interpretation of the “amount recoverable” language was that it referred to 
the amount actually recoverable (or recovered) from the insolvent insurer, 
not the amount set by the insolvent insurer’s policy limits. 
61 See cases cited supra note 57. Nonetheless, the phrase “amount 
recovery” is no longer used in excess insurance policies. 
62 Mission Nat’l Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 550, discussed in note 57.   
63 Id. at 553. 
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requirement that the underlying limits have been paid in full. In both cases, 
many courts give primacy to policy language to determine whether full, 
actual payment of policy limits by the underlying insurer is required as a 
condition precedent to reach the overlaying insurance. In both cases, modern 
policy language is often read by courts today as requiring payment of the full 
limits by the insurer before overlaying insurance may be accessed. 
In one way, however, insurer insolvency cases differ from “within 
limits settlement” between insureds and insurers—the insolvent insurer is 
liquidated in an administrative proceeding and confirmed by judicial process 
and review. Unlike the private bargain between the insured and the 
underlying insurer, insolvent insurer proceedings are specifically designed 
to provide a fair and efficient resolution of claims given the resources 
available. The presence of judicial oversight and review may persuade a 
court that sufficient protections exist so that the interests of overlaying 
insurers are protected, such that once the claim(s) is/are resolved the court 
may deem the attachment point satisfied. Judicial approval of a plan of 
liquidation of the insolvent insurer may be treated as a judicial determination 
that the attachment point was reached, even though the actual amount 
provided is less than the policy limits.64 
V. LOSS ALLOCATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN INSUREDS 
Insureds often enter into loss allocation agreements with each other 
and the meshing of these agreements with the risk transfer provided by 
insurance has proved difficult.65 For example, an insured (Contractor) may 
                                                          
64 See Canon Elec., Inc. v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Co., Case No. BC 290354 
(Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, August 17, 2017) (copy on file with 
the author). In this matter the trial court concluded that a judicial 
determination in liquidation of the amount the insolvent insurer would pay 
satisfies the exhaustion requirement even though the amount paid is less than 
policy limits. Id. at 50-55 (applying New Hampshire law). In effect the court 
concluded that a court order that the insolvent insurer had paid its obligations 
under the policy was equivalent to the actual payment of policy limits. 
65 See 4 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNER, JR., BRUNER & 
O’CONNER CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:554 (2d ed. 2017) (noting common 
use of risk-transfer agreements in construction industry and uncertainty, in 
the absence of specific identification of the problem in the insurance policy, 
regarding the primary of the risk-transfer agreement on the policy); Jeremiah 
M Welch & Julian D. Ehrlich, Horizontal Exhaustion: Challenges and 
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enter into an agreement with a third person (Subcontractor) in which 
Subcontractor agrees to exculpate the Contractor for all losses arising from 
Subcontractor’s performance of the agreement.66 Contemporaneously, the 
parties will agree that some or all of the parties will become additional 
insureds on a party’s existing coverage, to which that party’s insurer(s) 
agree. To what extent, if at all, should the indemnity agreement affect 
insurance coverage available to the parties to the indemnity agreement, here, 
Contractor and Subcontractor? And to the point of this paper, to what extent, 
if all, should the indemnity agreement affect exhaustion requirements 
regarding overlaying levels of insurance coverage provided by excess 
insurers? 
An example may help illustrate the problem. Subcontractor agrees 
to perform work on a construction project being built by Contractor. As part 
of the agreement, Subcontractor agrees to name Contractor as an additional 
insured on its (Subcontractor’s) primary liability insurance policy. 
Contractor has primary liability coverage with Alpha Insurance Company 
and excess coverage with Beta Insurance Company. Subcontractor has 
primary liability coverage with Omega Insurance Company and excess 
coverage with Theta Insurance Company. Both excess coverages purport to 
                                                          
Solutions, 40 NYSBA TORTS, INS. & COMPENSATION L. SEC. J., Summer 
2011 at 20. 
66 This is frequently accomplished by a “waiver of subrogation” rights 
which bar direct liability to the extent there is insurance in place that covers 
the loss. The effect of such a provision is to prevent the insurer that pays the 
loss from claiming reimbursement. These waivers are generally enforced and 
may not be used by insurers to refute coverage. See BRUNER & O’CONNER, 
JR., supra note 65; see also 1 SCOTT C. TURNER, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF 
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES, §5:7 (2d ed. 1999). A pre-loss release of liability 
has been treated the same as a waiver of subrogation rights. See Great N. Oil 
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1971). 
However, this decision involved a first party property insurance policy. In 
the field of construction disputes many jurisdictions restrict efforts to shift 
liability beyond that accomplished by insurance by barring insurers from 
obtaining reimbursement against those deemed additional insureds. See 
BRUNER & O’CONNER, JR., supra note 65; see also Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, Insurance: Subrogation of Insurer Compensating Owner or 
Contractor for Loss under “Builder’s Risk” Policy Against Alleged 
Negligent Contractor or Subcontractor, 22 A.L.R.4th  701 (1983). 
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be excess to the scheduled underlying primary policies and “all other 
collectible underlying policies.” Finally, Subcontractor has entered into a 
separate agreement with Contractor in which Subcontractor agrees to 
indemnify Contractors for any losses resulting from Subcontractor’s 
performance of its work on the job site pursuant to its contract with 
Contractor. 
Worker is injured on the job site and sues both Subcontractor and 
Contractor. The claim exceeds the limits of both primary policies, but not the 
limits of either excess policy. Both Subcontractor and Contractor tender 
Worker’s claim to all the insurers. Does the presence of the indemnity 
agreement affect the obligation of Beta Insurance Company (Contractor’s 
excess) or Theta Insurance Company (Subcontractor’s excess)? Does the 
indemnity agreement between the insureds affect the determination whether 
the underlying insurance is “collectible”? 
Both excess insurers could argue that under principles of horizontal 
exhaustion both the Alpha policy (Contractor’s primary) and the Omega 
Policy (Subcontractor’s primary) must exhaust before either excess insurer 
must step forward. Does the indemnity agreement between Contractor and 
Subcontractor change that by shifting responsibility for the loss away from 
Contractor (and Alpha)? 
More importantly, can Theta (Subcontractor’s excess) now disclaim 
liability on the ground that the Alpha policy has not been exhausted and, 
therefore, under principles of horizontal exhaustion, it’s (Theta’s) policy has 
not been triggered? In other words, Theta would contend that the Alpha 
policy remains “collectible” insofar as the Theta policy is concerned, even 
though by operation of the insured’s indemnity agreement the loss will be 
borne by Subcontractor (Theta’s insured)67 
Most decisions addressing whether insured–insured loss allocation 
agreements, such as the indemnity agreement between Contractor and 
Subcontractor, affect insurer obligations have involved disputes between 
primary insurers. In this context, courts have divided whether one insurer 
may use a loss allocation agreement, to which it (the insurer) is not a party, 
                                                          
67 I am assuming here that Contractor’s Non-liability is the expected 
outcome. Unlike the insurer’s defense obligation which can be triggered by 
potential liability within coverage, the insurer’s indemnity obligation rests 
on actual liability within coverage. However, as a practical matter, the 
insurer cannot know whether the insured will be deemed liable on nonliable. 
In the course of defending the insured, the insurer may be forced to make 
difficult decisions regarding settlement when its coverage obligations are 
uncertain because the liability of its insured is uncertain. 
2018      UNDERSTANDING THE “EXHAUSTION 293 
OF COVERAGE” DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF CONTINUOUS TRIGGER COVERAGE 
to escape its obligations under its insurance policy. One line of decisions 
holds that the insurer may rely on the insured’s explicit loss allocation 
decisions; another line of decisions holds the insurer to its commitments in 
its insurance policy and refuses to allow the insurer to use agreements to 
which it is not a party to escape obligations it has contractually assumed.68 
For the most part, however, these decisions do not address the issue of 
exhaustion because they do not involve excess insurance. 
Several decisions, however, have specifically involved disputes 
between primary and excess insurers where one of the insurers is using a loss 
allocation agreement, to which the insurer it is not a party, to trigger or avoid 
liability. 
In Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. v. Great American Insurance 
Company,69 the Contractor and Subcontractor had separate policies and the 
Subcontractor agreed to add the Contractor as an additional insured to its 
(Subcontractor’s) policies “without contribution by the Contractor’s own 
insurance.” A claim was made that would trigger the attachment point of the 
Subcontractor’s excess insurance, so a dispute arose as to the priority of 
involved policies. The Bovis court held that in the absence of policy language 
adopting or permitting the adopting of exculpatory agreements between 
insureds allocating responsibility for a loss, priority of coverage would be 
determined by policy language and judicially developed coverage rules, here 
horizontal exhaustion. The court concluded that excess policies would not be 
triggered until all the underlying primary policies had been exhausted.70 
In another New York case, however, the court appeared to recognize 
a loss allocation agreement as excusing the requirement that an underlying 
policy be horizontally exhausted before the attachment point of an 
overlaying excess policy would be triggered. In Indemnity Insurance 
Company of N.A. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company,71 insurers of the 
                                                          
68 See generally SCOTT M. SEAMAN & JASON R. SCHULZE, ALLOCATION 
OF LOSSES IN COMPLEX COVERAGE CLAIMS § 5.4[f] (2018); BRUNNER & 
O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 65. 
69 See Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. v. Great American Insurance 
Company, 855 N.Y.S. 2d 459, 462 (App. Div. 2008). 
70 Bovis Lend Lease v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 855 N.Y.S.2d at 464, 470-
71. 
71 Indem. Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.  900 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2010). Both decisions were from the 1st Department, but the 
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indemnitor (Subcontractor) accepted tenders of the indemnitee’s 
(Contractor’s) defense from the indemnitee’s insurer (St. Paul). The 
indemnitor’s insurers, (Royal (primary) and Indemnity Insurance Company 
of N.A. (excess)), subsequently settled the claim, with Royal paying its limits 
($1 million) and Indemnity Insurance Company paying $2 million. 
Indemnity Insurance Company, in turn, sought reimbursement from the 
indemnitee’s insurer, St. Paul. The court rejected Indemnity’s claim that St. 
Paul’s obligations were antecedent to its own and required exhaustion. Under 
the loss allocation agreement, the obligations of the indemnitee (Contractor) 
and its insurer (St. Paul) would “pass through” to the indemnitor 
(Subcontractor) and its insurer (Indemnity). 
This conflict in approaches is further complicated by the fact that the 
decided cases involve concurrent coverages rather than successive coverages 
applicable to a loss under a “continuous trigger” approach. Again, this 
illustrates the consequences of adopting a horizontal exhaustion requirement 
that assumes an even, rising tide progressively exhausting layers of coverage. 
In reality that rising tide must confront numerous obstacles that may interfere 
with the smooth upwards movement that the rising tide metaphor assumes. 
Courts generally have not addressed the issue of the effect of a risk-
transfer agreement between insureds on the coverage obligations of insurers 
in terms of exhaustion. But the effect of choosing to give, or not give, 
primacy to the risk-transfer agreement may affect how coverage is 
sequenced. If, on the one hand, the court gives primacy to the insureds’ risk-
transfer agreement, coverage is limited to the party that has assumed the 
risks. If vertical exhaustion is used, the obligation of overlaying insurers is 
determined by looking at coverage within the specific underlying policy 
period that is activated. However, if horizontal exhaustion is applied, giving 
primacy to the loss-allocation agreement may result in a loss of coverage 
because one or more insurance coverages in the insured’s insurance program 
will not be exhausted. If, on the other hand, the court does not give primacy 
to the insured’s risk-transfer agreement, the choice between horizontal and 
vertical exhaustion will be determined by the coverage language in each 
insurance policy. As noted in Part I of this paper, the literal terms of most 
insurance policies can be read, and have been read by courts, as providing 
for horizontal exhaustion as the pathway to accessing overlaying coverage. 
In this case, courts must determine whether horizontal exhaustion is the 
proper method for accessing overlaying coverages when a “continuous 
                                                          
Indemnity Insurance Company court did not cite nor discuss Bovis Lend 
Lease. 
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trigger” “all sum stacking” approach (“the giant uber-policy”) is adopted. 
This point is addressed next. 
VI. SUCCESSIVE COVERAGE AND EXHAUSTION 
As noted in this paper, the issue of exhaustion has normally been 
considered in the context of concurrent coverage, that is layers of coverage 
within a single policy year. A few courts have considered the exhaustion 
issue in the context of successive coverage (caused by application of a 
“continuous trigger”), but the courts, for the most part, have not viewed 
concurrent coverage cases different from successive coverage disputes 
insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned. That, in this author’s 
opinion, is a mistake. 
Proponents of horizontal exhaustion often use the metaphor of a 
rising tide, successively exhausting coverage layer by layer. When 
exhaustion doctrine is looked at broadly, one sees many situations where 
underlying policies will not be fully exhausted, due to coverage issues 
specific to those policies. While the rising tide metaphor makes some sense 
when applied to layers of coverage within a single policy period, the 
metaphor is ill-suited to the situation presented in “continuous trigger” “all 
sum stacking” cases where multiple policy periods are involved and the 
insured’s coverage profile often differs substantially from year-to-year. 
As a practical matter, when multiple policy periods are in play due 
to the application of a continuous trigger, it is highly likely that one or more 
of the underlying policies will not pay out its full limits due to one or more 
of the reasons set out in this paper. If horizontal exhaustion is applied, that 
failure to pay the full limits will, in effect, block the rising tide of exhaustion. 
Rather than a rising tide, a more appropriate way of seeing horizontal 
exhaustion is to envision a rising level of water that must proceed through a 
plethora of bottlenecks where upward movement will be blocked forever 
once the bottleneck of a single “unpaid in full” policy is encountered. That 
consequence is simply inconsistent with the “Uber” policy approach the 
California Supreme Court adopted in the State of California Continental 
Insurance Company decision. Horizontal exhaustion effectively transforms 
the “Uber” policy to a “Mini” policy by providing overlaying insurers with 
an escape card at the point any single underlying policy fails to pay its full 
limits. In effect, the “Uber” policy is an illusion if horizontal exhaustion is 
applied. More perniciously, horizontal exhaustion punishes the insured who 
acquires more insurance because more insurance increases the risk that one 
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of the additional insurance policies may fail to pay its policy limits, thus 
toppling what remains of the insured’s coverage program. Or to paraphrase 
the Notorious B. I. G.: the more insurance a policy holder obtains, adoption 
of horizontal exhaustion means the more problems the insured has in 
collecting on any of the policies.72 
When successive coverage arises by operation of a “continuous 
trigger” “all sums stacking” approach, the question is squarely presented 
how the overlaying coverage should be accessed. Simply adopting a solution 
by arguing that horizontal exhaustion is more consistent with the nature of 
the relationship between primary and excess insurance is insufficient for 
several reasons. First, successive coverage simply presents a different 
context in which coverage questions must be resolved and ignores the fact 
that the “continuous trigger” doctrine was adopted to address problems 
caused by great societal problems (asbestos, environmental degradation, 
etc.) which could be addressed more efficiently and effectively through the 
cost sharing and cost spreading attributes of insurance. Second, horizontal 
and vertical exhaustion requirements are complicated doctrines. As shown 
in this paper, whether and when, if ever, an underlying policy is exhausted 
and whether and when, if ever, an overlaying policy must respond to a loss 
is often a question fraught with uncertainty in the concurrent coverage 
context; that question becomes exponentially more uncertain when coverage 
is expanded in the successive coverage context. Third, treatment of an 
exhaustion requirement in successive coverage cases should reflect the 
reasons and values that led to the recognition of successive coverage through 
adoption of the “continuous trigger” “all sum stacking” approach. 
The approach that is plainly inconsistent with successive coverage 
is horizontal exhaustion. Adopting horizontal exhaustion, when coupled to 
the doctrine discussed in the paper, will often result in overlaying insurers 
completely escaping liability because one or more underlying policy in one 
or more years of the continuous trigger was not exhausted. The practical 
effect of adopting horizontal exhaustion is to limit successive coverage to 
primary insurers and give all overlaying insurers arguments to escape 
coverage all together. That would render the “continuous trigger” “all sums 
stacking” approach a toothless doctrine. 
                                                          
72 NOTORIOUS B.I.G., MO MONEY, MO PROBLEMS (Bad Boy Records 
and Arista Records 1997). 
